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The Recent Expansion of Fiduciary Obligation 
THE RECENT EXP ANSI ON 
OF FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION: 
Common Themes and Future Developments 
John D. McCamus * 
301 
A lawyer learns of his client's marital problems and 
consequently and successfully, pursues a romantic liaison with 
the client's spouse. A businessman enters into negotiations 
with the owner of a parcel of land with a view to entering into 
a joint venture to develop this property. The negotiations fail 
and the businessman, who has correctly inferred that the 
neighbouring property must be similarly valuable, acquires the 
neighbouring property. A banker encourages and arranges for 
loans to a customer to purchase shares of a target company 
with a view to obtaining control, mistakenly unaware that 
another department of the bank is assisting another shareholder 
engaged in a similar exercise. 
Prior to a reading of the recent case law on fiduciary 
obligation, 1 one wonders how many members of the profession 
would have quickly concluded that the one thing these three 
individuals had in common was that they had all engaged in a 
breach of fiduciary duty. The recent and remarkable expansion 
of fiduciary obligation was recently surveyed in a Law Society 
of Upper Canada symposium, Fiduciary Duties - A Matter of 
Trust (October 1986 - hereinafter "Symposium"). The present 
paper was originally presented as an attempt to develop and 
speculate upon themes common to the Symposium papers. The 
papers provided accounts of the recent use of the fiduciary 
concept in such contexts as real estate transactions, corporate 
law, employment law, partnership and professional relationships. 
One common theme that dearly emerged from the Symposium 
papers is that the fiduciary concept is being asked to do a 
great deal of work in a broad range of factual situations. 
Indeed, the remarkable growth of fiduciary obligation in the law 
reports has become one of the notable features of our 
jurisprudence and has, as one would expect, inspired a 
substantial law review literature and, indeed, two recent texts 
devoted exclusively to this subject. 2 
It may reasonably be asked, of course, whether the 
fiduciary concept is one which can bear this workload without 
sustaining a work-related injury of some sort. Although, as I 
shall suggest below, the extension of the concept to new and 
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intriguingly different fact situations should not be a cause for 
alarm, there is some evidence in the case law that the concept 
is drifting away from its moorings from time to time. As it is 
my view that this latter development does bring with it the 
risk of some confusion, I propose to draw attention to some 
basic ideas concerning the fiduciary obligation and then, having 
briefly explored the question of its extended application, offer a 
few brief comments concerning remedial issues. 
The Fiduciary Concept 
In very general and perhaps misleadingly simple terms, it 
may be said that the law of fiduciary obligations is a body of 
equitable doctrine arising from Equity's concern with equitable 
fraud. Breaches of duty thus lead to equitable remedies only 
and, more particularly, to the constructive trust, and equitable 
lien and the remedy of an accounting of profits. The first two 
of these have a proprietary nature and, apart from the usual 
advantages of propriet~ry remedies, c~rry with thei:i the 
· advantage that the eqmtable rules relatmg to the tracmg of 
property can be deployed by the plaintiff in identifying the 
property in the hands of the defendant that is subject to the 
remedial order. 
Although I confess that my reading of the Symposium 
papers has shaken my confidence to some extent, I persist in 
the belief that the idea underlying fiduciary obligation is a 
relatively straightforward one. In City of Toronto v. Bowes, 
Chancellor Blake expressed the central point in the following 
terms:3 
"The settled rule is, that he who is entrusted with the 
business of others cannot be allowed to make such 
business an object of interest to himself." 
The law of fiduciary obligation is but one of the subjects of 
the law of equity that have been brought together with the 
common law of quasi-contract to form the modern law of 
restitution.4 Thus, it is argued by scholars of the law of 
restitution that fiduciary obligation is one of the many areas of 
common law and equity that may be properly characterized as 
applications of the broad, underlying principle of the law of 
restitution that one who has been unjustly enriched at the 
expense of another is required to make restitution to the other. 
Further, the law of fiduciary obligation is said to manifest 
another broad, equitable principle which is also thought to be 
an organizing theme of the law of restitution, that is that 
wrongdoers shall not be permitted to profit from their 
wrongdoing. Breach of fiduciary obligation constitutes the 
wrongdoing. The remedies of constructive trust and accounting 
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of profits are available to remove pr_ofits made by the faithless fiduciary. 
The general framework of analysis in the fiduciar case 
law also s~ms reasonably straightforward. Laskin J., y as he 
then" was, .m Can. Ae~o Service L_td. v. 0'Malley5 identified 
~he four issues t.hat. arise for consideration in this area" as 
irst? t~e det«;rmm!lt10n that the relationship between the 
parties Is fiduciary m nature; second, the determination of the 
natu~e o~ the .duty or duties that arise from the particular 
delatwhnship; third, the determination of whether a particular 
uty as ~eel?- . breachedi and fourth, the determination of the 
ex_tent .of h!'1-b1hty resultmg from the breach in question We 
might imag~ne that Chancellor Blake would have added some 
fle~h to this. usef!-11 .skeleton by suggesting that where there 
bx1i:ts a relationship m which one party is entrusted with the 
usmes~ of an?ther, the first party is under a duty not to 
place his own mterest above that of the other and that where 
~h~ firs.1
1 
pbarty does so, any profit secured from breach of that 
u Y w1 e recoverable by the second party. 
As always, '?f ~ourse, the difficulty lies in applying these 
broa._* ftneral prmc1ple~ to ~articular fact situations. More 
spec~ Ici Y' so~e co;11fus1on arises in the determination that a 
part1~~ ar relat10nsh1p has a fiduciary character and in the 
defi~1t10n of ~he ~cope of the duties appropriate to that 
particular r.elat1onsh1~. Many, I fear, attempt to analyze these 
Issuesffi by sm:~ply !18kmg whether the particular defendant holds 
an o ice w~1ch is generall.Y recognized to be of a fiduciar 
nature and_, if. so, by assummg that the fiduciary has essentially 
all th~ o.bhl?at1ons of an express trustee. On both counts th.Y 
analysis. is likely to lead to error. 6 ' Is 
. With re~pect to the first issue, the identification of a 
fiduciary relationship, it is traditional to begin, as Scott does in 
the passage referred to by Crawford7 by asking "Wh · 
fiduciary?" and then by l1.st1"ng th t . l fido I~ a l t• h. e yp1ca 1 uc1ary 
re a I?ns ips such as trustee-beneficiary, principal-a ent 
guard1ar>;-ward, executor-legatees, solicitor-client, direc~ors~ 
~hrp~raj~~p, alani so on. Parenthetically, we should observe that 
e :a .1 ion ist would not have included employees banks or 
delio~u:tmg co-ventu~ers. T~is ~hopping list approa~h to the 
Aith1t1oh Sof fih~uc1ary obhgat1on may, however mislead 
o.ug . cott imself would commit no such erro; a listin · 
of this ku~d :nay ~ taken to suggest that fiduciary 'obli atio! 
!'1-dheres prmc1pally, if not exclusively, to the holders of c~rtain 
~hportahnt offices: Accor~ir>;gly, it may commonly be thought 
at t e trick m pred1ctmg the extension of the fiduciar 
c}:hcepth to new fact situations is to identify offices whic{ 
::1 oug not Y.et considei:ed fiduciary, are of sufficient 
importance to brmg them within the fiduciary net Such an 
approach may obscure from view and broad range· of possible 
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applications of fiduciary doctrine. 8 that Thus two of the Symposium papers suggest 
although the concept of fiduciary obligation h~ now. be~n 
extended to employees, it is likely to be restricte~ m its 
application to senior managem~nt pers~nnel. . In this, these 
authors are in good company. On this basis, however, we 
might be tempted to assume, for examp).e, that . an . errand boy 
would not be considered to have fiduciarY. obligations. And 
yet, in Re Coomber; Coombber v .. Coomber, 1° Fletcher Moulton 
L.J. offered the following o servation: 
"Fiduciary relations are of many different types; the.y 
extend from a relation of myself to an errand boy who is 
bound to bring me back m.Y chan~e up to ~he m<?st 
intimate and confidential relations which can P?ssibly exi~t 
between one party and another where the one IS wholly m 
the hands of the other because of his infinite trust in 
him." 
The errand boy illustration is perhaps far-fetched. The fi_rst 
errand boy . who breaches his fiduciary obligation by purc~asmg 
a winning lottery ticket with the change may well give ri.se to 
earnest consideration of Re Coomber. In. any ev~nt, . the ).1st of 
employees who may be subject to fiduciary obhgat1on IS n<?t 
likely to be constrained to senior management employees, and .it 
is therefore not surorising that one of the cases referred to m 
the Roebuck paper!l relates to the activities of a hearing-aid 
specialist at a department store. " 
The correct answer to the question "W?o is a fiduci8.!Y?. 
is, then, "anyone". If anyone can .be a fiduciary, ho~ever, it is 
also obvious that not everyone is, not all the time. The 
principal identifying characteristic of the fiduciary is that 
referred to above the fiduciary is one who has undertaken to 
act on behalf of :mother.12 More than this., there are a ~umb~r 
of recurring features of fiduciary relationships. The fiduciary is 
likely to either have stewardship of some . of the assets of t~e 
person to whom the ~uty is o~ed or will ho~d. an office m 
which there are umquely-available opportunities for se~f­
interested activity or, the r~lationship is !ikely ~o be one m 
which the fiduciary has cons1derabl~ authority or mfluence over 
the individual to whom the duty is o~ed. In ~he c:bsen~e of 
such factors, it is unlikely that a fiduciary. relationship will be 
found but as it is difficult to be more precise about the nature 
of fiduciary obligation than this, it is not surprising . th!lt the 
list of applications of as broad and open-textured a prmciple as 
this continues to grow in length. . . 
Once one has identified the existence of the relat1onsh1p, 
the next and equally important question, as Laskin J. stressed 
in Can. Aero, 13 is the defmition of the scope of the duty. 
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:rhe fiduciary duties of an errand boy are obviously not· as 
mtense as those of a lawyer or a director of a corporation. 
As Crawford points out in his Symposium paper14 the 
most obvious starting point for this analysis is the ~ctual 
undertaking of the fiduciary and the expectations of the other 
party which flow therefrom. There appear to be cases 
how~ver, .wher~ Courts are reluctant to find that a fiduciary 
relationship exists because of an assumption that a broadly-
based duty t~ account for profits will necessarily accompany it. 
Arguably, Midcon Oil 8 Gas Ltd. v. New British Dominion Oil 
Co.,15 discusse~ by Goldenberg in bis Symposium paper,16 is a 
case of that kmd. In that case, two companies developed a 
natural gas field as a joint venture, one of the companies 
~urning respo~sibility for operating the field. In order to 
improve marketmg prospects, the operator promoted a company 
to manufacture chemical fertilizers which would become a major 
consumer of the natural gas. The inactive partner sought one-
half of the operator's share of the fertilizer company on the 
ground that the operator had exploited its fiduciary position to 
profit from promotion of the fertilizer business. A majority of 
the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the claim on the 
ground that p.o fiduciary obliga~ion ~xiste?. Rand J. dissented 
on the basis tl~at t.he relationship did have a fiduciary 
character. On this point, surely, Rand J. had the better side 
of the argument. Reasonable jurists could no doubt differ 
however, on the more difficult joint as to whether the fiduciary 
duty thereby created extende to embrace an opportunity of 
the kind exploited by the defendant. 
. ~ summary, then~ it .is in ~he nature of the fiduciary 
obligation concept that it will continue to find new application 
in novel factual situations. Further, to the extent that its 
app~tite for novel application is a source of anxiety, the 
anxiety may be reduced by keeping clearly in mind the point 
that the definition of the scope of the duty is a separate 
exercise which should provide a check on over-breadth of 
application of the concept. 
Testing the Limits of Fiduciary Obligation 
If in general terms, then, the remarkable frequency of 
fiduciary analysis in the law reports in recent years ought not 
to b.e a source of c?ncern, it is nonetheless my impression from 
reading the Symposmm papers that the concept is indeed being 
overworked to some extent in the recent case law. Fiduciary 
obligation may well be being asked to do too much in the 
~ense that it is ~eing utilized to analyze situations for which it 
is not well smted. A number of the factual situations 
described in the various papers appear to me to be much more 
amenable to analysis in contract or as breach of confidence or 
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negligence cases in tort. 
A partial explanation for this phenomenon would appear 
to be that fiduciary obligation is being used as a device to fill 
in gaps or remedy deficiencies in these other areas of the law. 
In the cases discussed by Roebuck,17 for example, there appear 
to be two traditional rules with which the Courts are no longer 
completely satisfied. The "customer list" rule is now evidently 
thought to be too narrow a constraint on competition by 
former emrloyees, at least as far as senior employees are 
concerned.1 Secondly, the rule that ineffective, non-competition 
clauses are struck down in their entirety appears to be 
considered unattractive.19 In each case, we now have cases 
imposing fiduciary obligations in such fashion as to undermine 
or do an "end run" around these traditional rules. If reform is 
desirable and it may well be, it would surely be preferable to 
confront 'more directly the policy considerations underlying the 
traditional rules. 
Similarly, the law of contract has ha~ so~e difficulty. in 
dealing effectively with pre:-contractual s1tuat10,n~· Unlike 
American law, Anglo-Canadian law has trad1t1onally not 
recognized a duty to bargain in good faith. 20 In at least one 
recent case 21 such a duty was in fact imposed on the 
somewhat doubtful theory that a fiduciary relationship was in 
place prior to the enteriD;g into of a <:ontract of employ~ez:it. 
The theory is doubtful m~mu~h as it ~ee~ very. art1fic1al 
indeed to construe the relat10nsh1p of negot1atmg parties as one 
in which one party is in fact acting on behalf of the other. In 
another case dealing with a pre-contractual situation,22 an 
Ontario Court imposed fiduciary obligations with respect to 
confidential information disclosed in the context of such 
negotiations. Again, leaving aside what . may arguably b~ tfie 
rather special circumstances of that case, it seems very art1fic1al 
to construe negotiating parties as having such a relationship. 
Accordingly, the misuse of confidential information in such a 
context would seem much more suitably dealt with by the 
emerging tort of breach of confidence. 23 The breach of 
confidence liability requires no special relationship of a fiduci~y 
character and is accordingly better suited to deal with 
situations in which the parties may understandably believe 
themselves to be dealing with each other at arm's length. 
The application of the fiduciary concept to corporations 
and partnerships gives rise to somewhat simila: concer~s. The 
interesting issue raised in two recent cases discussed m the~e 
papers one relating to a law firm and the other to a bank, is 
wheth~r the firm or bank will be liable for breach of a 
fiduciary duty where the breach rests on the conduct of a 
natural person who was unaware of the relationship developed 
by another natural person employed by that firm or bank. 
The question in such cases is whether, even though neither of 
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the natural persons may be in breach of a fiduciary obligation, 
the corporation or firm is liable on the view that the combined 
knowledge and combined conduct of the two natural persons 
constitutes a failure to act in a manner consistent with a 
fiduciary obligation of the corporation or firm to its customer 
or client. In Davey v. Woolley, Hames, Dale 8 Dingwal l,24 
the Ontario Court of Appeal clearly indicated that it would not 
permit law firms to suffer schizophrenia, that the firm itself 
would be saddled with the collective knowledge and actions of 
individual members of the firm. This result seems particularly 
defensible in the context of law firms where the potential for 
divided loyalties is a well understood problem and something 
which firms typically attempt to prevent through a number of 
administrative means, as well they should. On the other hand, 
the Standard Investments Ltd. v. C.I.B.C.25 case, discussed by 
Crawford 26, suggests that an approach of this kind may very 
considerably complicate life for a large, bureaucratic 
organization such as a bank. In Standard Investments, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal imposed liability on the bank on the 
theory that the two natural persons in question were both of 
sufficient status, Harrison being the bank's Chairman and 
Wadsworth its Chief Executive Officer, to constitute "directing 
minds and wills" of the bank and that the bank would be 
presumed to act as a fiduciary and would have attributed to it 
the cumulative knowledge and actions of the two individuals. 
The facts of the Standard Investments case are rather 
unusual inasmuch as two very senior individuals, both active in 
the same area of corporate responsibility, had apparently failed 
to discuss their respective involvements in the related and very 
important transactions which were held to cumulatively amount 
to a breach of the bank's fiduciary obligation to the plaintiffs. 
One wonders, however, whether fiduciary analysis would fit so 
appropriately into these fact situations if the officials in 
question had less proximity and less reason to be knowledgeable 
of each other's actions than in this case. If neither of the 
natural persons involved had any reason to believe themselves 
to be in breach of fiduciary duties, it can at least be said that 
the application of the rule will be surprising to the individuals 
involved and will operate very differently than it does in its 
traditional context. Indeed, if Mr. Wadsworth has done 
nothing that would lead us to describe him as a faithless 
fiduciary, one wonders whether we have adopted the right 
analytical model when we implicate him in a breach of 
fiduciary duty to the bank's client. To be sure, the test for 
breach of fiduciary obligation should be objective rather than 
subjective. Further, there is a persistent line of analysis in the 
fiduciary case law arguing for a strict standard of liability 
either because of the need for deterrence or because of the 
evidentiary difficulties encountered in establishing breach of 
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fiduciary obligation.27 Nonetheless, fiduciary analysis is in its 
least persuasive role when it imposes liabilities that individuals 
acting in good faith had no reason to anticipate. 
Again, would it not be possible to analyze this type of 
fact situation in contract or tort? What kind of advice did 
the bank, through the actions of Mr. Wadsworth, contract to 
provide to the plaintiffs? Was that advice rendered with 
sufficient skill and care? Perhaps it was not, but if it was so 
rendered, we may wonder whether the liability imposed on the 
bank is appropriate inasmuch as it appears to reflect a general 
policy that banks ought not to provide financial and other 
forms of support to two different clients who are engaged in a 
competitive bidding exercise. It may be desirable to impose 
duties on banks, similar to those shouldered by law firms, not 
to "act" on both sides of a transaction, but this is an issue 
wotthy of more discussion than it has received in this case. 
Further, it is not obvious that the usual remedies for 
breach of fiduciary duty would fit appropriately into this 
context. In fact, the P.laintiff recovered only its lost 
investment. However, if the situation is accurately 
characterized as one of breach of fiduciary obligation, it may be 
asked whether the bank should have been required to disclose 
its "ill-gotten" gains. Should Mr. Black, a director of the bank 
- assuming he had known of or assisted in the breach - have 
had to disgorge his profit as the successful purchaser of Crown 
Trust? Certainll, these outcomes are arguable on traditional 
fiduciary theory. 2 
The migration of fiduciary duties of this kind into the 
functioning of large, financial intermediaries, particularly as we 
approach the possibility of greater integration in this sector of 
the economy, appears to be a potential source of excitement in 
the law reports. As Crawford points out, 29 it is not at all 
obvious that the highest of so-called Chinese walls could solve 
the Standard Investments ~roblem. On the other hand, as 
Professor Ziegel has argued, 0 a careful reading of the Standard 
Investments case itself suggests that the Ontario Court of 
Appeal has left open the possibility that a Chinese wall defence 
may be available on appropriate facts. 
Another situation in which liabilities have been imposed 
on parties acting in good faith and on the assumption that 
they are not in breach of fiduciary duties arises in the context 
of duties imposed on strangers to the fiduciary relationship. 
Crawford31 provides us with the example of the recent 
imposition of the constructive trust remedy on banks who 
follow instructions from faithless fiduciaries by, for example, 
honouring a cheque drawn on a trust account. There has been 
some suggestion in the English case law32 that the receiving 
bank may be saddled with constructive notice of the fiduciary's 
breach of duty and be required to account for the money 
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disbursed, even though the bank may not have benefited in any 
meaningful sense from the transaction. Crawford's lack of 
enthusiasm for the imposition of such liabilities33 is mirrored in 
more recent English case law 34 and it is difficult to resist his 
conclusion that the broad scope of the duty imposed on a bank 
to make inquiries in suspicious circumstances suggested in these 
cases is better defined by the law of negligence. There is no 
suggestion in these cases that the bank is itself a fiduciary, of 
course, but again, obligations to account that may be very 
difficult for the ordinary person acting in good faith to 
anticipate are imposed on grounds of breach of trust. 
In summary, then, there appear to be a number of 
situations in which fiduciary obligation analysis has supplanted 
more familiar doctrines of contract and tort and, in my view at 
least, it is not always apparent that clarity of analysis has 
been fostered by this development. Further, it appears that 
fiduciary obligation is being used to some extent as a 
surreptitious device for correcting and reforming existing 
doctrine. While one would not wish to be seen to stand in the 
way of progressive evolution of common law doctrine, one may 
also ask whether a more direct attack on the deficiencies of 
existing doctrine might be a more satisfactory manner of 
accomplishing this objective. 
Remedial Issues 
A second major reason underlying the remarkable growth 
of the fiduciary concept relates to remedial issues. A number 
of remedial advantages flow from application of fiduciary 
analysis, the most important of which, of course, is that the 
constructive trust remedy, when available, holds forth the 
possibility of proprietary relief. 35 This is coupled with the fact, 
referred to by Crawford,36 that English jurisprudence has to 
some extent purported to link the constructive trust exclusively 
with fiduciary obligation. 37 This, in a case where proprietary 
relief is, for some reason, a particularly desirable solution to 
the problem at hand, there will be an understandable 
temptation to "find" that the relationship between the parties 
is of a fiduciary character. 
Perhaps the best, recent, English illustration of this 
creation of what might be referred to as "instant fiduciaries" is 
to be found in Chase-Manhattan Bank v. Israel-British Bank.38 
In that case, the plaintiff mistakenly paid the defendant for a 
second time an amount in excess of $2,000,000 U.S., not 
realizing that the payment had already been made. Shortly 
thereafter, the defendant became insolvent and it was suggested 
that the plaintiff should rank with all of the other unsecured 
creditors. Although there is obviously little or no basis on 
such facts to find the existence of a fiduciary relationship of 
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the traditional kind, Goulding J. held that the defendant bank 
held the second payment as a fiduciary on the terms of a 
constructive trust and accordingly, the plaintiff was allowed to 
lift the second payment out of the insolvent's estate. Under 
traditional analysis, it seems rather likely that the plaintiff 
would have been left to the in personam claim historically 
available in quasi-contract (or, in the modern terminologv~ 
restitution) to recover moneys paid under a mistake of fact.3 !1 
The obvious unfairness in subjecting the plaintif Ps second 
payment to the rigours of the insolvency inspired a rather 
expanded notion of the nature of fiduciary obligation. 
As expert testimony in Chase-Manhattan itself indicated, 
American law is in this respect very different from English law. 
The American view, well reflected in the Restatement of 
Restitution,40 is that the constructive trust is merely a remedy 
available in cases of "unjust· enrichment" which is not at all 
restricted to cases of fiduciary obligation. Thus, in American 
law, there would be no reason why a thief could not be held to 
hold stolen property as a constructive trustee, even though 
there would be no basis whatsoever for suggesting the existence 
of a fiduciary relationship and American authority so holds. 41 
It is Crawford's view42 that this restricted aspect of 
English law, whatever its current status in England, has never 
been a part of Canadian law on this point. What is in any 
event certainly beyond doubt is that The Supreme Court of 
Canada in Pett/ms v. Becker43 explicitly adopted the American 
theory of constructive trust and made the remedy available in 
circumstances in which no suggestion of fiduciary obligation was 
present. Accordingly, there is now plainly no need to invent 
"instant fiduciaries" in order to make the constructive trust 
remedy available and accordingly, one hopes that this particular 
source of pressure on the growth of fiduciary obligation will 
dissipate. 
Indeed, the adoption of the American or unjust 
enrichment theory of constructive trust in Pettkus should 
facilitate a more far-reaching reassessment of the equitable 
remedies available in restitutionary contexts, including the 
fiduciary context. For example, once one accepts the view that 
constructive trust is merely a proprietary remedy available in 
some restitution cases, one is led to consider what kinds of 
circumstances might suggest that proprietary relief is a more 
suitable remedy than in personam relief. In the fiduciary 
context for example, the old learning from Lister 8 Co. v. 
Stubbs44 is that a distinction is to be drawn between bribes 
and other kinds of property acquired by fiduciaries and that 
proprietary relief should not be available with respect to the 
former. Although the employee accepting bribes is subject to 
an accounting for their value to his employer, the Court 
reasoned that the bribes were not accepted by the employee as 
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an agent for the employer and accordingly, proprietary relief 
would not be available. This line of reasoning leads to the 
anomalous result that the remedies available against an 
employee accepting bribes in breach of fiduciary obligation are 
less vigorous than those available in other cases of default. 
The unjust enrichment explanation of constructive trust makes 
it quite unnecessary to find that ill-gotten gains were acquired 
"on behalf of" the principal in the Lister v. Stubbs sense and 
provides a basis for its overruling. 
If Pettkus v. Becker provides us with a basis for 
reconsidering Lister v. Stubbs, it may also serve as a foundation 
for a more comprehensive review of the relationship between 
proprietary and in personam relief in the law of restitution. 
This is a subject for a larger paper, but in the present context 
it may at least be noted that the Chase-Manhattan Bank case 
itself suggests one potentially fruitful idea. Proprietary relief 
would seem to be particularly appropriate in situations in 
which the plaintiff is, as in that case, an involuntary creditor. 
The use of constructive trust in the fiduciary context to strip 
the faithless fiduciary of all profits generated by him is also 
suggestive of a broader principle. The trust remedy provides a 
disincentive for conduct viewed as particularly wrongful. To 
the extent that the general question of the relationship of the 
two different kinds of remedies is provoked by Pettkus, this 
may well have implications for the use of the constructive trust 
and accounting remedies in the fiduciary context. 
It seems likely that greater familiarity with the use of 
equitable proprietary relief in the fiduciary context and 
elsewhere will also lead to some reshaping of the equitable 
tracing rules. As Jessel M.R. pointed out in Re Hallett's 
Estate; Knatchbull v. Hallett, 45 "· •• the moment you establish 
the fiduciary relation, the modern rules of Equity, as regards 
following trust money, apply." Again, this is a subject for a 
much larger paper, but it will be recalled in general terms that 
common law tracing rules rest on a rather physical conception 
of the notion of property.46 That is to say, common law would 
incline to the tracing of physical assets, be they goods or 
banknotes as long as they, or a substitute for the original 
thing, could still be seen and identified. Thus, it is generally 
believed, although the point remains a contentious one, that 
one cannot trace at common law moneys which have been paid 
into a bank account and mixed with other moneys.47 Equity, 
on the other hand, clearly permitted tracing into mixed funds 
whether the mixture resulted from the fiduciary mixing his own 
money with that of the plaintiff or mixing the money of a 
number of innocent beneficiaries in the same account. Equity 
established a set of presumptions to untangle such mixtures. 
The most notorious of these is the so-called rule in Clayton's 
Case48 which provides that in the case of a mixed account 
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from which a series of disbursements has been made, the 
burden of the disbursements will be allocated to the various 
beneficiaries on a "first in, first out" basis. Many have 
observed and remarked upon the randomness and arbitrariness 
of the results achieved in this fashion. 49 Accordingly, a recent 
decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in O.S.C. v. Greymac 
Credit Corp.50 in which the Court held that it would not apply 
the rule is very much to be welcomed. In an elegant and 
learned opinion, Morden J .A. adopted an approach which would 
visit the various depredations made on the fund on a pro-rata 
basis to the beneficiaries, calculated on the basis of their 
respective contributions. Hopefully, the shift in Canadian 
jurisprudence away from the English model to the unjust 
enrichment model will facilitate a rethinking of this area more 
generally. 
Finally, I note that there have been one or two 
suggestions in the recent case law to the general effect that 
damages may be an appropriate remedy in the context of 
fiduciary obligation. In Szarfer v. Chodos, 51 for example, the 
plaintiff client was held entitled to recover special and general 
damages flowing from the adulterous affair the defendant lawyer 
conducted with the plaintiffs wife, in breach of his fiduciary 
obligations to the plaintiff. Although there is more ancient 
support for the notion of damages as a remedy for fiduciary 
duty, 52 they do not appear to have been awarded with any 
frequency. Presumably, this is because in many cases where 
compensation for loss appears appropriate, damages in tort or 
contract would be an available alternative. If damages in the 
sense of compensation for consequential loss are to be 
considered a readily available remedy for breach of fiduciary 
duty, this would represent a substantial change in fiduciary law 
and should, I would suggest, involve us in some rethinking of 
the nature of fiduciary obligation. At the present time, the 
nature of the duty is essentially one requiring the defendant 
not to profit from breaches of fiduciary duty. To hold that 
the fiduciary is also liable for all of the consequential damages 
that may flow from his failure to perform the fiduciary 
obligation is, in effect, to convert fiduciary obligation into a 
contractual undertaking to provide faithful fiduciary service. 
Perhaps it would conduce to clearer thinking to restrict this 
development to situations where such contractual arrangements 
are clearly present in the actual relationship of the parties. 
For present purposes, however, and without any intention of 
trying to discourage creative evolution of fiduciary doctrine, it 
is sufficient to note that a shift to damages liability would 
involve a significant change in the remedial consequences of 
breach of duty and this should, in turn, lead us to give careful 
consideration to the nature of the duty imposed. It is one 
thing to insist that ill-gotten gains be disgorged or accounted 
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for, quite another to hold that the defendant is responsible for 
all consequential loss flowing from a breach of duty. We set 
very high standards for fiduciaries. While such standards may 
be appropriate where the liability is profit recovery, they may 
not be if liability for consequential loss is to be imposed. At 
the very least, it would seem that some breaches of fiduciary 
duty should not have this consequence. In short, broad 
acceptance of a damages remedy should, in my view, rest upon 
some fundamental rethinking about the nature of fiduciary 
obligation. 
In summary, then, the remarkable growth of fiduciary 
doctrine reported on in these papers seems consistent with its 
historical tradition and its open-textured structure. As Arnup 
J.A. said in Laskin v. Bache and Co.,53 " ••• the category of 
cases in which fiduciary duties and obligations arise . . . is no 
more 'closed' than the categories of negligence at common law." 
No doubt, it is realistic to expect that both fiduciary obligation 
and negligence will expand to cove+ new types of commercial 
and other activity in years to come~ My own wishful thinking 
with respect to fiduciary obligation is that it would conduce to 
clear thinking if fiduciary obligation were restricted to 
relationships of the traditional fiduciary character, rather than 
have the concept expand essentially in order to solve problems 
that might be more straightforwardly addressed by revision to 
the law of contract or the law of tort. Further, I very much 
hope that the adoption of the American view of constructive 
trust in Pettkus v. Beclcer54 will be seen to provide an 
appropriate basis for reconsiderin~ a number of remedial issues 
relating both to fiduciary obligation and to the law of 
restitution more generally. A review of Canadian case law on 
these subjects suggests that this is a problem that our Courts 
are well equipped to tackle. 
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